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Dr. Nettel proposes an account of the argumentative function of legal principles as topoï, 
that is as argumentative items that convey values accepted by a particular legal 
community. In her view, legal principles are used to balance or give priority to certain 
values in designing legal institutions. In this way they determine the way in which these 
institutions are meant to resolve a particular problem. Since in this conception legal 
principles are culturally dependent, the solution to a particular legal problem with the aid 
of the principles will give rise to different legal solutions in different legal cultures. For 
this reason Dr. Nettel argues that the transfer of institutions from one legal culture to 
another may be disruptive for the function of a society because each legal culture gives its 
own meaning, weight and balance to a particular legal principle and will therefore give 
different outcomes. 
On the basis of this general account of the argumentative function of general legal 
principles, she gives an analysis of the function of the general legal principle of legal 
certainty that constitutes the basic principle of the institution of Law and forms the basis 
of the institution of Law in modern states governed by the law. This general principle of 
legal certainty is based on the need to avoid arbitrary action of governmental power. It 
means that coercion should be applied on the basis of existing rules, and in accordance 
with an established procedure. 
Dr. Nettel explains that this basic idea of legal certainty may lead to different 
conceptions of the institution of a procedural system of law, depending on the culture in 
which this system of law functions. As an example, she takes the adversary legal 
procedure of criminal law as developed in Anglo-American systems and the inquisitorial 
legal procedure of criminal law as developed in continental legal systems. She argues that 
in the Anglo-American system the principle of certainty is interpreted in such a way that 
priority is given to the position of the defendant and his right to self-defence with the 
consequence that these individual rights are given priority over the search for truth, thus 
resulting in an adversary system of criminal law with a passive judge. In the continental 
system the principle of certainty is interpreted in such a way that priority is given to a 
search for the truth, thus resulting in an inquisitorial system of criminal law with an 
active judge. 
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From this explanation of the way in which different conceptions of the principle 
of certainty may result in different institutions of a criminal procedure, Dr. Nettel 
concludes that the implantation of a particular system of criminal law may give rise to 
serious problems, as is demonstrated by the introduction of the adversarial system by 
American governments in Latin-American nations. In her view, this forced introduction 
has led to a disfunctionality of the administration of justice in countries where insecurity 
is at stake. 
In my view Dr. Nettel has given a very systematic and interesting theoretical 
analysis of the role of general legal principles as culturally dependent values in 
interpreting and weighing the way in which legal institutions resolve particular legal 
problems. I agree with her theoretical analysis of the argumentative function of legal 
principles in general, and the principle of certainty in particular. However I have two 
questions regarding some details of the way in which se applies the theoretical analysis to 
concrete cases. 
1. My first point concerns the analysis of the way in which legal certainty leads to 
a preference for a passive judge in an adversary system of criminal law and an active 
judge in an inquisitorial system of criminal law. In the analysis of Dr. Nettel I miss an 
explanation of the way in which the principle of certainty is used in weighing the choice 
for a particular role of the judge in both systems from the perspective of the goal of the 
principle: the need to avoid arbitrary action of governmental power by a guarantee of a 
procedure according to existing rules. Given the fact that the weighing and balancing on 
the basis of the principle leads to different institutions in different cultures it would be 
interesting to know which cultural factors influence the preference for a choice for the 
different procedures of criminal law. For example, why does the Anglo-Saxon culture 
give priority to the individual rights of the defendant and why does the continental culture 
give priority to the finding of the material truth? 
Furthermore, in her discussion of the continental criminal procedure, it is not 
completely clear how the principle of certainty is served by the respect for the 
defendant’s right to self-defence, the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to 
remain silent. 
In my view the analysis would profit if she could specify how various specific 
cultural factors influence these choices. 
2. My second point concerns her claim resulting from the conception of legal 
principles as culturally determined topoï that the transfer of an institution from one legal 
culture to another may be disruptive for the function of society. In her conclusion Dr. 
Nettel mentions an example of a situation in which such a transfer of a legal institution, 
i.e. the American adversary model imposed on Latin-American nations, has caused big 
difficulties. In my view the analysis of the role of the principle of legal certainty would 
profit if she could clarify which consequences this transfer has had on the legal culture in 
particular countries and in which way a more inquisitorial (or mixed accusatorial-
inquisitorial) system based on continental law systems of criminal law would have been 
more suitable, given the legal culture in these countries. 
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